



The doctrine of privileged communications between at-
torney and client is the oldest of the privileges in Anglo-
American law.' The purport of this article is to discuss the
doctrine mostly from an evidence viewpoint. However, to
discuss fully the privilege, it is only proper that some phases
of the doctrine be approached from the ethical side. There-
fore, a minor portion of the discussion revolves around the
ethical problem involved.
In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,2 an
elucidation of the privilege is stated:
"The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted
holder of the privilege is or sought to become a
client; (2) the person to whom the communication
was made (a) is a member of the bar of a court,
or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the-com-
munication relates to a fact of which'the attorney
was informed (a) by his client (b) without pres-
ence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing
primarily either (i) an opinion of law or (ii) legal
services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceed-
* George L. Hudspeth, 2d year law student, Duke; B.S. T.C.U. 1950.
1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, § 2290 (3d ed. 1940). The doctrine finds Its
origin during the reign of Elizabeth In the 1500s. "But the theory
. .. in those days, was very different from that of modern times.
It was an objective, not a subjective, one,---a consideration for the
oath and the honor of an attorney, rather than for the apprehensions
of his client. . .. 'The first duty of an attorney,' It has been said, 'is
to keep the secrets of his clients.'
"That doctrine, however, finally lost ground, and by the last quarter
of the 1700s . . . was entirely repudiated. The judicial search for
truth could not endure to be obstructed by a voluntary pledge of se-
crecy; nor was there any moral delinquency nor public odium In break-
ing one's pledge under force of law.
"[The] new theory looked to the necessity of providing subjectively
for the client's freedom of apprehension in consulting with his legal
adviser." (emphasis as shown In the text)
§ 2294. "As the 1700s drew to a close, It came first to be conceded
that 'the privilege was that of the client.'"
2 89 F.Supp. 357 (D.Mass. 1950).
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ing, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a
crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client."
This is a succinct statement of the rule, but does it give
an answer to its many ramifications? What elements are
necessary to create the relation of attorney and client?
When is one seeking legal advice? When and how does the
relation terminate? To answer these questions, we must
look to the decisions of the courts. And, at the same time,
it should be remembered that, since the rule tends to give
rise to a concealment of the truth, it should be applied
strictly, if at all.3
L Holder of the Privilege Must be or is Seeking
to Become a Client
It seems quite clear that if an attorney has refused out-
right to become employed by a party, the privilege will not
obtain.4 At just what point the relation of attorney-client
will come into existence, however, is often hard to determ-
ine. The case of Keir v. State5 holds that where a commun-
ication is made to an attorney with a view of hiring him
as counsel for professional purposes, even though the at-
torney is not subsequently employed, it will be privileged.
The relation is generally a matter of contract, either ex-
press or implied, but it is a sui generis relation not to be
determined by pure contract law, as the unique feature of
the relation must be given considerable weight because of
Ibid., and cases cited note 42 infra.
Setzar v. Wilson, 26 N.C. 501 (1844). This was a case where an
attorney told a party "he always believed there was so much rascality
on one side and ignorance on the other that he did not care to have
anything to do with the case; and after that, the defendant George
made the declarations which the plaintiff proposed to prove." See,
also, McGrede v. Rembert Nat. Bank, 147 S.W.2d 580 (Tex.Civ.App.
1941) where the attorney promptly informed the client he could not
represent her.
11 So.2d 886 (Fla. 1943). This was a case in which the client wrote
letters to the attorney in regard to hiring the attorney in a divorce
action. The letters were held to be privileged communications.
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the policy of the rule.6 That policy seems to be that com-
munications made by a client to his attorney should not be
divulged without the client's permission, because only in
this manner can there be a proper administration of justice.
Thus, it was held in Alexander v. United States :7
"If he [defendant] consulted him [attorney] in
the capacity of an attorney, and the communication
was made in the course of his employment, and
may be supposed to have been drawn out in conse-
quence of the relations of the parties to each other,
neither the payment of a fee nor the pendency of
litigation was necessary to entitle him to the priv-
ilege."
This statement suggests the conclusion that "a commun-
ication to an attorney, under the impression that he had
consented to act as attorney of the party is privileged, even
though the attorney himself may not have so understood
it." 8 Also, where an attorney has repeatedly acted in real
estate transactions (or any other sort of transactions) for
a client, and even though the client did not specifically em-
ploy the attorney for a particular transaction in which the
attorney acted, it has been held that the relation existed.9
II. The Person to Whom the Communication Was Mtade
(a) Mlust be a MIember of the Bar of a Court, or his
Subordinate and (b) in Connection with this Commun-
ication is Acting as a Lawyer
(a) Must be a member of the bar of a court, or his subor-
dinate. "The doctrine of privilege communication is con-
fined to cases of counsel, solicitor, and attorney."'10 In the
application of this doctrine it has been held that a law stu-
6 WIGmoRE, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2291. "The policy of the privi-
lege has been plainly grounded, since the latter 1700s, on subjective
considerations. In order to promote freedom of consultation of legal
advisers by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclosure by the
legal adviser must be removed; and hence the law must prohibit such
disclosure except on the client's consent. Such Is the modern theory."
" 138 U.S. 353 (1891).
8 66 Am.St.Rep. 216. See, also, cases cited therein.
1 Guy v. Avery County Bank, 206 N.C. 322, 173 S.E. 600 (1934).
20 Brungger v. Smith, 49 Fed. 124 (C.C.D.Mass. 1892).
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dent who has an office open to the public is not qualified as
a member of a bar;" that an attorney who has a license to
practice only before a justice of the peace is sufficient to
create the privilege ;12 that where communications are made
to a person who is an "attorney in fact" but not an attorney
at law, the communication will not be privileged.13
There is no absolute rule that the communications will
not be privileged where made to one other than an attorney
or counsel. But where such communications are made to
someone other than an attorney, to obtain benefit of the
rule, it must be proved that the receiving party was an
agent or clerk of the attorney who was to act for the client.14
It would seem to be an undus burden on an attorney to
settle each little detail (such as typing letters, documents,
or other records) of his client's case, and in such event the
attorney's subordinates should be restricted from revealing
what they might peruse or gather in the attorney's office
insofar as it concerns a client's confidences. This is appar-
ently the rationale for holding that communications made
in the presence of a stenographer, 5 those made to necessary
" Holman v. Kimball, 22 Vt. 555 (1850). This was a case in which
It was stated that to extend the privilege to apply to law students
would be "embarrassing to courts and liable to grossest abuses." See,
also, Barnes v. Harris, 7 Cush. 576 (Mass. 1851).
1 English v. Ricks, 117 Tenn. 73, 95 S.W. 189 (1906). The attorney's
license would not permit him to proceed with the case (divorce) since
justices of the peace are without jurisdiction in such matters. Yet,
everything communicated to the attorney was privileged. The court
held "it would not be proper to permit one having such limited license
to obtain confidential communications on the faith of his office as an
attorney and then divulge them on the ground that the particular kind
of case was beyond his legal power."
13 State v. Smith, 138 N.C. 700, 50 S.E. 859 (1905), a case In which
a prisoner made certain declarations, a type of confession, to one not
an attorney, and later the prisoner asked the latter to "do what he
could for the prisoner," whereby he did endeavor to aid the prisoner
on the day of the preliminary hearings. The court ruled that the "at-
torney in fact" should be allowed to testify to the communications as
made by the prisoner.
1' See notes 15, 16 and 17 infra.
I State v. Krtch, 123 N.J.L. 519, 9 A.2d 803 (1939). The attorney
had a secretary present to take down statements of the client.
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agents,'0 and those made by an agent of the client to the
attorney are privileged.17
Perhaps it should be the rule that a client, once he enters
an attorney's office, should inquire as to the position of the
party with whom he is conversing before he relates any
data concerning his business for coming to the office. One
interesting case along that line is that of Barnes v. Har-
rs.' s This case, even though a very old one, is apparently
still good law in Massachusetts. In this case, a law student
worked in the office of an attorney. He was so working
when a client came into the office of the attorney to
obtain some legal advice. The client made certain commun-
ications to the student relative to the former's claims against
another party. The lower court ruled "that it was not
competent for the witness [the student] to testify to any
statements then made to him by the plaintiff, for the pur-
pose of obtaining professional advice." The case was taken
to an appellate court on exception to the exclusion of this
testimony and it was there ruled:
" . . as the rule operates on the exclusion of evi-
dence, the courts have always felt inclined to con-
strue it strictly and narrow its effect. We believe
the rule is . . . that it 'is confined strictly to com-
munications to members of the legal profession, as
barristers and counselors, attorneys and solicitors,
and those whose intervention is necessary to secure
and facilitate the communication between attor-
ney and client; as interpreters, agents, and attor-
ney's clerks.'
"The witness, in this case, was not of the legal pro-
fession; and though he was a student in an attor-
ney's office, yet it does not appear that he was
either the attorney's agent or clerk for any pur-
pose."
Does such a case not place an undue risk on the client?
From a general knowledge of agency law one would be in-
21 State v. Loponio, 85 N.J.L. 357, 88 At. 1045 (1913), a case in
which a fellow prisoner, acting as scrivener for another prisoner who
could not write English, wrote a letter to be sent to a lawyer. Dicta-
tion of the letter was held privileged.
27 In re Helle, 65 Ohio App. 45, 29 N.E.2d 175 (1939).
28 See note 11, supra.
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clined to say this student was at least the agent of the
attorney. Or, if not an agent of the attorney, why should
not the court have said that if the client reasonably believ-
ed the student to be a proper person to talk to, the com-
munications should have been privileged? The student had
testified at the trial that "he did not know but the plaintiff
[client] supposed him to be Mr. Whitney [attorney]; and
that the conversation was relative to the plaintiff's claims
against the defendant, as to which the plaintiff consulted
the witness." It seems only proper that a communication
made by a client under such circumstances should be privi-
leged, and that the law of privileged communications should
not be so fossilized.
(b) Must be acting as a lawyer. In the United Shoe
case, supra, a mere soliciting of business advice or the giv-
ing of such advice was held not sufficient to creat a privi-
lege. And where an attorney is acting as a mere agent for
a party, he may be examined as a witness without any priv-
ilege being invoked.19 Therefore, when is a person acting
as a lawyer? Do the above cases mean that communica-
tions which are made to an attorney-director of a corpora-
tion are not the type of communications which give rise to
the privilege, or that an attorney-director of a corporation
is not in the proper position for the privilege to be invoked?
It is submitted that there are many situations in which,
even though acting in a dual capacity, a lawyer-director
would be under a moral compulsion to retain the secrets he
received by virtue of his employment. On the other hand,
the bare existence of an attorney-client relation should not
always be sufficient to give rise to the privilege. An exam-
United States v. Vehicular Parking, Ltd., 52 F.Supp. 751 (D.Del.
1943). Suit under Anti-Trust law. The court said in part: "As active
business manager of defendant Vehicular, he did not, I suspect,, wear
his lawyer suit when he taxied over to the Department of Justice
building and voluntarily turned over to the government the exhibits in
controversy as well as the many writings concerning the Vehicular
Group of defendants of which Joynt [attorney as well as promoter
and director of Vehicular] was neither the sender nor the receiver.
In short, I conclude, when he made his delivery of the documents to
the Anti-Trust Division, he did so as the agent of the corporation in-
volved; patently not as their adviser."
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ple of such a case would be, as shown above, where the at-
torney-director merely gave some sought after business
advice.20
One interesting hypothetical situation along such lines is
this: suppose that A, a director of a corporation, is also an
attorney. If the board of directors is in session and some
point under discussion which requires the knowledge of an
experienced legal counsel comes up, and A is asked to give
his professional opinion on the subject, and he does give
that opinion in the presence of all the remaining directors,
would such communications be considered privileged? Fur-
ther, would it make any difference whether the board was
at a regularly called meeting, an informal meeting, or that
the directors owned all the stock of the corporation ?21
Under these circumstances it could be argued that the
relation of attorney and client did exist between this attor-
ney and the board of directors, because the board was seek-
ing professional advice presumably in a confidential man-
ner. However, would the presence of all the directors pre-
clude a privilege on the theory that the communication was
made in the presence of strangers, which, according to au-
thorities shown later, would destroy any privilege which
might otherwise have existed? Or, would the better view
be that, since the board was acting for the corporation, the
former became a client, in which case the privilege would
be appropriate? Authority on this point is negligible, but
it is submitted that all the reasons for the privilege are
here present, and the exigencies of the manner in which a
board often has to carry on its policy-making should bring
this situation within the purview of the doctrine. By this
"ITd. at 753. In In re Fisher, 51 P.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) Informa-
tion was given to an accountant for the purpose of having financial
statements made therefrom, and the communication was held not
privileged even though the accountant, acting as an attorney, also
rendered legal advice on the basis thereof. See, also, Turner v. Turner,
123 Ga. 5, 50 S.E. 969, 107 Am.St.Rep. 76 (1905); Gronewald v. Grone-
wald, 304 Ill. 11, 136 N.E. 489 (1922); Estate of Huffman, 132 Mo.App.
44, 111 S.W. 848 (1908); Howe v. Stuart, 68 Misc. 352, 123 N.Y.Supp.
971 (Sup.Ct. 1910) ; Lifschitz v. O'Brien, 143 App.Div. 180, 127 N.Y.Supp.
1091 (2d Dep't. 1911).
m As to the legal effect of different forms of board meetings, s13 BAL.-
LmqTmE, CoProRATioNs, §§ 42-48 (1946).
PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS
argument it is not meant that a corporation as such cannot
become a client, because it is elementary that a corpora-
tion may be a client. But the above situation is somewhat
different from the flat proposition of a corporation being a
client in some form of litigation.
Finally, the privilege should not extend to any and every
statement made, or to general conversation, or to the relat-
ing of information to an attorney as a personal friend.22
For the privilege to exist, the attorney must be acting in
his professional capacity when the communication is made,2
and whether he is so acting will be determined by the court
from all the facts appearing in a particular situation.24
MI. The Communication must Relate to a Fact of which
the Attorney was Informed (a) by his Client (b) With-
out the Presence of Strangers (c) for the Purpose of
Securing Primarily Either (i) an Opinion of Law or
(i) Legal Services or (ill) Assistance in some Legal
Proceeding, and not (d) for the Purpose of Commit-
ting a Crime or Tort.
2 Modern Woodmen of America v. Watkins, 132 F.2d 352 (5th Cir.
1942). A case in which the insurer defended an action on life policies
on the ground the insured committed suicide. The insured's statements
to an attorney that the former was "going west" or that "they'll find
him in the river" were held not privileged.
21 See note 19 supra at 753. See, also, Potter v. Barringer, 236 Ill. 224,
86 N.E. 233 (1908); 64 A.L.R. 180, 192.
- Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N.Y. 394, 36 Am.Rep. 627 (1830). A case in
which an attorney, who also kept a liquor store, testified that one of the
defendants came to his store and in the presence of others (though it
was not proved the others heard the conversation) put a hypothetical
case to the attorney who had acted as counsel for said defendant in
other cases and the attorney gave an opinion as to what its outcome
would be. After the attorney gave the defendant his opinion, the de-
fendant informed the former what the real transaction was, just as the
defendant was going away. The attorney did not consider that he was
advising the defendant; he had no general retainer and received no fee
for his professional opinion. There was no suit pending, but this suit
was afterwards brought on the transaction spoken of. The court said
"he who seeks aid or advice from a lawyer ought to be altogether free
from the dread that his secrets will be uncovered; to the end that he
may speak freely and fully all that is in his mind." The court further
stated "Though he [attorney] disclaimed on the trial that he acted in a
professional capacity, that was a matter for the court to determine from
the facts appearing."
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(a) Informed by his client. It is elementary that the
information must come from the client or his agent. Thus,
where information was obtained by an attorney from a
witness other than his client, it was not privileged.2 Little
else need be said of this requirement.
(b) Without the presence of strangers. There will be
numerous instances in which necessary strangers are re-
quired to be present in preparing defenses of clients or pre-
paring some claim for them. Such instances are shown
under II (a) above. That type of stranger is excluded under
the present prerequisite. The strangers here involved may
be described as unnecessary or those who have no interest
in the matter at hand.
Where two or more persons consult with an attorney at
the same time about the same matter, it is generally held
that the communications then made are privileged if there
should arise in the future some form of litigation between
the two, but the privilege will subsist if that litigation is
between one of the original parties and a third person. 20
Also, where a communication is made in the presence of
an unnecessary third person, whether with or without the
client's knowledge, the privilege is not available,27 and in-
formation obtained by an attorney from a third person,
's Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947). "[TIhe protective cloak
of this privilege does not extend to the information which an attorney
secures from a witness while acting for his client in anticipation of liti-
gation." See, also, Schwartz v. Public Service Coordinated Transport,
64 A.2d 477 (N.J. 1948), which cites the Hickman case. Of. People v.
Singh, 123 Cal.App. 365, 11 P.2d 73 (1932).
2 Allen v. Ross, 199 Wis. 162, 225 N.W. 831 (1929). In this case a
mother and her daughter went to an attorney to have mutual wills exe-
cuted. Later, in a case in which the question of privileged communica-
tions was brought out, the court held "Each heard what the other said,
so that the disclosures were not, as between them, confidential, and there
can be no reason for treating such disclosures as privileged." Citing
Hurlburt v. Hurlburt, 128 N.Y. 420, 28 N.E. 651 (1891) which dealt with
the same type factual situation.
-7 Mitchell v. Towne, 31 Cal.App.2d 259, 87 P.2d 908 (1939); Ver Bryck
v. Luby, 67 Cal.App. 842, 155 P.2d 706 (1945). But, see Bacon v. Frisbie,
note 24 supra, in which the court intimated even if the communication
was made in the presence of third persons, it would have to be clearly
shown that said third person or persons heard or knew the substance of
the communication before it would be held as not privileged. See, also,
WIGMoim, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2326.
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even though those facts were then known to his client, is
not privileged. 28
The reasoning for the privilege doctrine is that the client
should be allowed and encouraged to relate information
to his counsel concerning his controversy in a confidential
manner. It would follow that, where the information is
given in the presence of a third person, the client himself
is expressly or impliedly leaving an impression that he does
not desire confidentiality. Confidentiality, incidentally, is
not to be presumed from the mere relation of attorney and
client. Thus, where an attorney has received information
which was intended to be relayed to another party, such is
not privileged. 29 And where a client does not seek confiden-
tiality, there is no rationale for the privilege to remain.
(c) For the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an
opinion of law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in
some legal proceeding.
This stipulation is intermingled and overlapping of that
in II (b) above. Certainly a prime requisite of the privi-
lege is that an opinion of law should be given, rather than
an entirely non-legal opinion as to how someone should
carry out a business venture. It would be unwise, and de-
cidedly not in keeping with the policy of the doctrine, to
allow a party to seal the lips of an attorney in respect to
any and every communication made to the latter. The cases
seem generally to hold that unless the client approaches the
attorney with a view of gaining some point of law concern-
21 Hawley v. Hawley, 114 F.2d 745 (D.C.Cir. 1940). In Tutson v. Hol-
land, 50 F.2d 338 (D.C.Cir. 1931) it was held "The limits of the rule, how-
ever, are well defined, and as its tendency Is to stifle a full disclosure
of the truth, courts have been careful to confine it within its legitimate
scope, and so it has been held that the rule does not apply to the discov-
ery of facts within the knowledge of an attorney which were not com-
municated by a client though he became acquainted with such facts while
engaged as attorney for the client." Of. People v. Singh, note 25 supra.
" Hiltpold v. Stern, 82 A.2d 123 (D.C.Mun.App. 1951). In this case an
attorney testified as to certain offers and counter-offers which he com-
municated between the parties. It was held that the "mere relation of
attorney and client does not raise the presumption of confidentiality and
communications made to an attorney for the purpose of being conveyed
by him to others are stripped of their confidentiality and therefore are
not privileged."
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ing a controversy or right which the client wishes to assert
against another there is no reason to allow the privilege to
exist. As noted earlier, the court will not hold the giving
of mere business advice as privileged. 0
Another situation is that in which a client goes to coun-
sel with the prime purpose of gaining legal advice or assist-
ance in instituting a legal proceeding, but during that con-
sultation conversation is made by the client in regard to the
person against whom he wishes to bring the proceeding,
but yet collateral to the main purpose of his visit with the
attorney. The court in such a case might rightfully hold
that the communication, concerning the collateral conversa-
tion, would be admissible as evidence in later proceedings
inasmuch as it was not communicated for the object of ob-
taining legal advice or opinion and it should be considered
a "mere gratis dictum.831
There are cases in which the pertinent communications
cannot be separated from the impertinent. In that event the
only way to give effect to the rule is to allow all that is com-
municated to be privileged.8 2  But if there can be found a
situation in which the relevant material is separable from
the irrelevant, then that which is relevant will be privileged
and the remainder will not83
(d) Not for the purpose of committing a crime or tort.
It must be readily admitted that there are limits beyond
which the privilege should not extend. One such limit is
the following :4
"The confidences of such persons [clients] may le-
gitimately be protected, wrongdoers though they
have been, because ... the element of wrongdo-
21 Cases cited note 20, supra.
3 People v. Marcofsky, 219 Ill.App. 230 (1920). Here, wife went to
an attorney seeking advice on instituting divorce proceedings against
her husband, and, while or during the period of consultation with the
attorney, she related to the attorney that unless her husband returned
her diamond earrings she was going to sue the husband for pandering.
The court held such statements admissible as evidence and not privi-
leged.
2 Maas v. Bloch, 7 Ind. 202 (1855).
3 McDonald v. McDonald, 142 Ind. 55, 41 N.E. 336, 344 (1895).
" Wiemnue, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2298.
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ing is not always found separated from an element
of right; because when it is, a legal adviser may
properly be employed to obtain the best available
or lawful terms of making redress; and because
the legal adviser must not habitually be placed in
the position of an informer. But these reasons all
cease to operate at a certain point, namely, where
the desired advice refers not to a prior wrongdo-
ing, but to a future wrongdoing." (emphasis add-
ed).
The privilege should not be extended to seal the lips of an
attorney in a situation in which he is approached for infor-
mation as to some contemplated future wrongdoing; nor
should it be allowed as a weapon of offense to enable persons
to carry out crimes against society. Thus, where a client
hired an attorney to represent her in a claim which she was
prosecuting and told the attorney she had been injured
while riding on a train, though actually she had not been,
and, upon learning of the true facts, the attorney withdrew
from the case, at which time the client employed a second
attorney to carry on the case, the first attorney was per-
mitted to testify in the final litigation when called as a
witness, the court holding the communications as made to
the first attorney were not privileged. 5 Neither can the
privilege be invoked to cloak a fraudulent scheme; 36 nor
that concerning a client's contemplated criminal act.3 7 But
where the communication is made as relating to an execut-
ed fraudulent transaction, the privilege will exist.38
One very interesting case dealing with contemplated fu-
1 Gebhardt v. United Rys. Co. of St. Louis, 220 S.W. 677 (Mo. 1920).
'1 United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1939); Securities and
Ex. Comm. v. Harrison, 80 F.Supp. 226 (D.C. 1948); A. B. Dick Co. v.
Marr, 95 F.Supp. 83 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); and see WIGMoBE, op. cit. supra
note 1, § 2298.
31 Abbott v. Superior Court, 78 Cal.App. 19, 177 P.2d 317 (1947), a
case in which an attorney was alleged to be active as a member of a
conspiracy to violate a law prohibiting abortions and he was allegedly
counsel for a fellow member in an attempt to further the illegal pur-
pose of the conspiracy. Held, the communications to the attorney
were not privileged. See 125 A.L.R. 519 for cases holding that "as a
foundation for such evidence there must be a prima facie showing of
the criminal activities of the client."
Hartness v. Brown, 21 Wash. 655, 59 Pac. 491, 495 (1899).
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ture crimes which deserves special mention is that of Peo-
ple v. Singh. 9 In that case, an attorney was approached
by a party, other than either of the three defendants in-
volved, to represent defendant X. This attorney made a
visit to the jail where the defendants were being held, and
had an interview with defendant Y. During this interview
Y told the attorney that he and the defendants X and Z
were guilty as charged (assault with attempt to kill), but
that they were not worried about the outcome as prepara-
tions were being made to bribe the jury and witnesses.
Later, the counsel appeared at the arraignment for all three
defendants, argued for a reduction in bail, entered a plea
of not guilty and requested a date for a hearing. The at-
torney was not paid his retainer fee of $1000 as promised
and he immediately withdrew. At the trial the attorney
appeared as a witness for the prosecution. Over objection
he was allowed to testify to the conversation with the de-
fendant Y and that he never considered himself attorney
for either of the defendants. The defendants were found
guilty, but on appeal the case was reversed and it was held
that the testimony given by the attorney was inadmissible
as it was privileged.
It is submitted that the whole policy behind the privilege
was breached in the Singh case. From the background of
the law, and especially in light of the cases cited immed-
iately above, why should not the attorney have been free
to testify to the contemplated bribery? It was a future
contemplated crime, and even though it was not carried
out (which does not appear from the case report), the
testimony should readily be admitted in order that society
be protected from the connivings of those guilty of a crime
who endeavor to be found innocent through perjury, trick-
ery and schemes. It may be said that the court would have
held differently if the attorney had withdrawn immediately
upon learning of the proposed bribery instead of waiting
until he had appeared at the arraignment at which time he
did not get the promised retainer. But is there reason for
placing society in jeopardy of a miscarriage of justice be-
See note 25 supra.
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cause of the mercenary attitude of an attorney? Perhaps,
as has been suggested by others, the answer should be left
to the state legislature. 40
The American Bar Association has felt so strongly about
the limits of the privilege, as regards future crimes, that an
ethical Canon has been adopted dealing with the topic. It
reads in part :41
"The duty to preserve his client's confidence out-
lasts the lawyer's employment ...
"If a lawyer is falsely accused by his client, he is
not precluded from disclosing the truth in respect
to the false accusation. The announced intention
of a client to commit a crime is not included within
the confidence which he is bound to respect. He
may properly make such disclosures as to prevent
the act or protect those against whom it is threat-
ened."
Was it not at least the ethical duty of the attorney in the
Singh case to disclose the proposed bribery? Usually, in
order to avoid extending the bounds of privilege, the courts
will strictly construe the privilege in accordance with its
object.42
,o 21 CAwF. L. REV. 67 (1932) in which there is a comment on the
Singh case.
1 Canon 37, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETICS, (Proceedings of the
American Bar Association, 1936).
42 See note 2 supra, at page 358. That case quotes the following
from Comment to Rule 210 of the A.L.I. Model Code of Evidence: "In
a society as complicated in structure as ours governed by laws as com-
plex and detailed as those Imposed upon us, expert legal advice is
essential. To the furnishing of such advice the fullest freedom and
honesty of communication of pertinent facts is a prerequisite to induce
clients to make such communications, the privilege to prevent their
later disclosure is said by courts and commentators to be necessary.
The social good derived from the proper performance of the functions
of lawyers acting for their clients is believed to outweigh the harm
that may come from the suppression of evidence in specific cases."
Then the court adds "But the privilege should be strictly construed in
accord with its object." See, also, Prichard v. United States, 181 F.2d
326, 328 (6th Cir. 1950); People's Bank of Buffalo v. Brown, 112 Fed.
652, 654 (3rd Cir. 1902).
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IV. The Privilege has been Claimed and not Waived
Whenever the privilege exists it attaches to the client
and not to the attorney,43 and the client may waive it either
expressly or impliedly.44  Where a witness (client) volun-
tarily testifies to a communication as made to his counsel,
it will not be privileged as the client is deemed to have
waived his privilege,4 but by merely becoming a witness
the client has not waived the privilege,40 and the rule ap-
plies when the client is a witness as well as where the
attorney is asked to testify.4 7 Waiver does, however, take
place when the communication is made in the presence of
unnecessary third persons,48 or when the client accuses his
13 Abbott v. Superior Court, supra, note 37. "The privilege, where
it exists, is the client's, not the attorney's and if it results in the pro.
tection of the attorney it does so only accidentally as a result of the
assertion of the client's right."
" Jones v. Nantahala Marble & Talc Co., 137 N.C. 237, 49 S.E. 94
(1904). Here, the attorney sued the client to recover fees. The client
introduced as witness an attorney who was associated with the plain-
tiffs in the litigation in which the claims for the fees arose, for the
purpose of showing that the plaintiffs' charges were excessive. Held,
the defendant thereby waives the privilege of secrecy attaching to a
confidential communication between the witness-attorney and the de-
fendant, and hence such communication is admissible to show the
witness had a different opinion at the time the communication was
made. See, also, State v. Artis, 227 N.C. 371, 42 S.E.2d 409 (1947).
Tripp v. Chubb, 69 Ariz. 31, 208 P.2d 312 (1949). The attorney
was called by the court to testify and admit his file concerning the
formation of a partnership. Held, "under our statutes and the de-
cisions of this court a client who offers himself as a witness and vol-
untarily testifies to such communications is deemed to have waived
the privilege and in effect consented to the examination of such an
attorney."
4" State v. Pusch, 46 N.W.2d 508, 524 (N.D. 1950). This was a case
in which the defendant was on trial for murder. Defendant was "ask-
ed if in that conversation [between defendant and his attorney] the
defendant did not say to his attorney 'If I confess, will I get some of
my money back.' " Held, "communications between an attorney and
his client are privileged and the privilege extends to the testimony of
the client and he cannot be compelled to testify as to what he com-
municated to his attorney in confidence or as to what was communi-
cated to him by his attorney. ...An accused does not by becoming a
witness waive the protection of the rule that a communication to him
by his attorney is privileged."
,7 See, Shelly v. Landry, 79 A.2d 626 (N.H. 1951); Bx parte Martin,
141 Ohio St. 87, 47 N.E.2d 388, 395 (1943).
" See cases cited in note 27, supra.
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former attorney of incompetency. In the case of Everett
v. Everett,49 dealing with a charge of incompetency of an
attorney, the court said:
"The object of the rule ceases and the attorney is
no longer bound by his obligation of secrecy when
his client or his representatives charge him, either
directly or indirectly, with fraud or other improper
or unprofessional conduct. Under such circum-
stances he may testify as to the facts."
In addition to the matter of waiver, the privilege has been
held to terminate upon the death of the client.5 0 On the
other hand, where communications have been made to an
attorney, and a third party brings action against the estate
of the deceased client, the attorney may not disclose those
matters communicated to him by his client.5 1
The apparent reason for allowing the privilege to exist
after death in some instances and not in others can be found
in this summary given by Brown, J., in Glover v. Pattern:52
". .. We are of the opinion that, in a suit between
devisees under a will, statements made by the de-
ceased to counsel representing the execution of the
will, or other similar documents, are not privileg-
ed. While such communications might be privi-
leged if offered by third persons to establish claims
against an estate, they are not within the reason of
the rule requiring their exclusion, when the contest
is between the heirs or next of kin." (emphasis
added)
It seems to be the policy of the rule to allow the client's
secrets to remain inviolate even after death unless there
It 319 Mich. 475, 29 N.W.2d 919, 922 (1947), and cases cited therein.
Hecht's Administrator v. Hecht, 272 Ky. 400, 114 S.W.2d 499
(1938), a case in which the attorney had prepared a will for the de-
ceased client. See annotations 64 A.L.R. 184 et seq. Cf. Baldwin v.
Commissioner of Int. Rev., 125 F.2d 812, 814 (9th Cir. 1942).
n Peyton v. Werhane, 126 Conn. 382, 11 A.2d 800, 803 (1940), a case
in which the court stated that "The general rule of the common law
is well settled that an attorney may not disclose matters communi-
cated to him by his client under the confidence arising from the pro-
fessional relation, in an action brought against his client's estate by
a third party." And, see, Panell v. Rosa, 228 Mass. 594, 118 N.E. 225,
226 (1918).
r 165 U. S. 394, 406 (1897).
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is some justifiable reason to permit the attorney to divulge
them. Litigation between those claiming an interest in a
decedent's estate by will, intestate succession, or equitable
claim creates such a reason. But an interest would not
exist in a suit by a third person who does not come within
some like category.53
Disbarment for Disclosure of Privileged Communications
and Statutes
It is only proper that some space be devoted to the pen-
alties imposed for disclosure of a privileged communica-
tion. In United States v. Costen,54 a disbarment proceed-
ing, an attorney was employed by a client, and, after acting
as such for a period, he ceased to be so employed. He then
wrote letters to the opposing counsel saying:
"I have acquired knowledge during my employment
of facts of great importance. I am no longer em-
ployed by the complainant. I want to be employed
by you, and I will put you in possession of these
facts, though I do not want to be known as under
your employment."
The court ruled:
"Now it is the glory of our profession that its fidel-
ity to its client can be depended on; that a man may
safely go to a lawyer and converse with him upon
his rights or supposed rights in any litigation with
the absolute asurance that that lawyer's tongue is
'tied from ever disclosing it; and any lawyer who
proves false to such an obligation and betrays or
seeks to betray any information or any facts that
he has attained while employed on the one side, is
guilty of the grossest breach of trust. . . . The
motion for disbarment will be allowed."
3 See cases cited note 51, suipra.
" 38 Fed. 24 (C.C.D.Col. 1889). See, also, In re Boone, 83 Fed. 944
(C.C.N.D.Calif. 1897); In re Marron, 22 N.M. 252, 160 Pac. 391, 395
(1916); In re Proujan, 257 App.Div. 297, 13 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1st Dep't.
1939).
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It is submitted that this privilege doctrine would be of
no importance if the communications as made by a client to
his attorney could be divulged without any redress what-
ever.
In conclusion it must be stated that the majority of the
states have statutes in one form or another pertaining to
privileged communications between a client and his attor-
ney. Therefore, in the preparation of any legal research
concerning this age-old principle, the respective statutes
should be consulted. But as a general rule, the statutes
follow fairly closely the rule as outlined in the United Shoe
case, supra.i5
r See, WiGmOmo, op. cit. supra note 1, § 2292.
